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Abstract 
A normative conflict arises when there exist multiple plausible norms of behavior. In such 
cases, norm enforcement can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we 
refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative conflict enhances the 
likelihood of a feud in a public-good experiment. We find that punishment is much more 
likely to trigger counter-punishment and start a feud when there is a normative conflict, than 
in a setting in which no conflict exists. While the possibility of a feud sustains cooperation, 
the cost of feuding fully offsets the efficiency gains from increased cooperation.  
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“[I]nformal enforcement is perilous when the parties to a dispute are likely to disagree on 
who owes what to whom. Then [informal enforcement] may lead to a feud – an endless echo 
of reciprocal, and possibly escalating, sanctions.”  Ellickson (1991, p.253) 
1. Introduction 
Feuds, long sequences of costly retaliatory actions, are a remarkable phenomenon. 
They are typically initiated when an individual takes an action to avenge a perceived insult or 
injustice. In some cases, the cycle of retaliation can escalate to violent physical attacks and 
even homicide. Considering their cost, feuds are surprisingly common. In recent years, for 
example, feud-related killings have been reported in Afghanistan (Raghavan, 2007; Walsh, 
2005), Albania (Arie, 2003; Pancevski and Hoxha, 2010), Australia (Millar, 2010; Rintoul, 
2010), China (WuDunn, 1993), Greece (Murphy, 1999; Nikolopoulos, 2009), India 
(Bhaumic, 2005), Iraq (Chivers, 2003), Italy (Popham, 2007), Russia (Shuster, 2010), The 
Philippines (Torres, 2007), Turkey (Birch, 2009), the U.K (BBC News, 2010)  and the U.S.A 
(Xiong, 2010).
1 
Why do feuds occur? Why do individuals take revenge when doing so could have 
perilous consequences for them? Why do they continue to engage in costly retaliation even 
when it is obvious that the other party is likely to continue the feud? Presumably there are 
multiple reasons, including economic, sociological, institutional, neurological, and 
idiosyncratic factors. In this paper, we focus on one of the potential causes. In particular, we 
consider the hypothesis that normative conflict renders a feud more likely.  
A normative conflict arises when there are multiple norms, prescribing different actions 
as being socially acceptable. In such cases, the use of punishment to enforce one of the norms 
could provoke counter-punishment and lead to a feud if the individuals concerned disagree 
about which norm is appropriate. Indeed, one of the most notorious feuds in history, that 
between the Hatfields of Kentucky and the McCoys of West Virginia, has been attributed to 
normative conflict (Ellickson, 1991; p.220). Normative conflict can arise naturally in many 
situations. Consider for example the production of a public good by a group of individuals. 
When individuals derive similar benefit from the public good, there may be an expectation 
that all beneficiaries contribute equally to its provision. However, in many instances, the 
value of the public good differs among individuals. The difference may be due to personal 
characteristics, past investments, luck or other factors. In such cases, determining the 
                                                            
1 These extreme cases are, of course, not the only settings in which feuds can arise. See McGreggor (2007) and 
The Economist (2010) for discussions of corporate feuds. See Andersson and Pearson (1999) and the references 
therein, for a discussion of intra-organizational feuds and their negative impact on efficiency.  3 
 
appropriate level of contribution becomes difficult, and disagreements or tensions between 
individuals could result.
2  
We test the hypothesis, that normative conflict increases the likelihood of a feud, with a 
laboratory experiment. Using previous economic experiments as a guide, we construct a 
social dilemma setting, in which it is feasible for a feud to arise as a consequence of norm 
enforcement, and for the feud to be sustained if players so choose. We include a treatment in 
which we have prior reason to suppose that there would be a normative conflict. We also 
include a control treatment, in which norm enforcement and feuding are possible, but where 
there is no normative conflict. The addition of this treatment allows us to isolate the impact of 
a normative conflict on the likelihood and severity of a feud. In a third treatment, a normative 
conflict could arise from the existence of multiple norms, but feuding is prohibited. This 
treatment allows us to study the impact of a prohibition of feuding on behavior, outcomes, 
and overall welfare in a setting with a normative conflict.   
The game we use in our experiment is a variant of the voluntary contributions 
mechanism for public good provision. The game has been used extensively to examine the 
efficacy of norm enforcement (see, e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009). In 
our experiment, subjects are assigned to groups of four players. All group members are given 
the same endowment and must decide how much of it to contribute to the public account. 
Contributing to the public account generates a positive externality to all other group members 
and increases efficiency. However, each group member has a dominant strategy to place none 
of his money in the public account, making the game a social dilemma. Once players make 
their contributions, individuals observe how much the other members of their group have 
contributed to the public account and can punish them, reducing each other's earnings at a 
cost. The duration of the game is determined by the group members' punishment activity. If 
punishment continues to be disbursed, then as long as some group members have positive 
earnings, the game continues and individuals can counter-punish. Thus, norm enforcement 
can be detrimental for efficiency if a feud breaks out. 
To introduce normative conflict, two of the four group members are assigned higher 
returns from the public account than their peers. This induces two prominent and plausible 
                                                            
2 The term normative conflict is frequently found in the social psychology and law literature. To our knowledge, 
the term has not been used previously in economics. However, economists have long discussed the tension 
between equality and equity – a specific case of normative conflict. Equality refers to the equalization of 
outputs, while equity typically refers to individual compensation in proportion to one’s input. As Hopkins and 
Kornienko (2010, p.106) write: “Perhaps there is no other economic debate older than that over inequality. 
While most people agree that some reduction of inequality is desirable, there is no consensus over what is meant 
by equality, nor over what should be equalized”.  4 
 
norms. The first is that all individuals make the same contribution to the public account. This 
implies that individuals with high returns from the public account earn more than their low-
return counterparts. The second norm is that individuals with high returns contribute 
sufficiently more to the public account so that all group members have equal earnings. To 
increase the tension between the equal-contributions norm and the equal-earnings norm, prior 
to playing the public-good game, group members participate in a real-effort tournament. The 
two best performers within each group of four receive greater returns from contributions to 
the public account than the other two group members. The rationale for this initial selection 
process is that, if individuals have worked to earn their higher returns from the public 
account, it might make them less willing to accept the equal-earnings norm. 
Normative conflict raises the issue of norm selection. Ellickson (1991) has 
hypothesized that the norms that tend to be selected are those that maximize group efficiency 
net of enforcement costs.
3 In our experiment, if the punishment required to enforce the norm 
is sufficiently low, this rule would specify that the equal-contributions norm would be 
selected and each individual would contribute his entire endowment. However, if individuals 
are sufficiently averse to inequality (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), it 
is plausible that this norm can fail to arise, as it leads to highly unequal payoffs among 
agents. Young (1998) argues that in such cases individuals will reach a compromise, which in 
our experiment would imply that low-return types contribute less, but high-return types earn 
more. As Elster (1989) notes in a discussion of evidence from social psychology, individuals 
may select social norms in a self-serving manner. In our experiment, this would imply that 
each type of agent favors the norm that yields him greater earnings: the high-return group 
members would favor the equal-contributions norm, while their low-return peers would 
prefer the equal-earnings norm.  
We hypothesize that the emergence of feuds is more likely in the presence of normative 
conflict than in the absence of such a conflict. In previous social dilemma experiments, 
punishment is predominantly directed at individuals who contribute less than their peers and 
thus have greater earnings (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000; 2002). However, in our experiment, 
contributing less than one’s peers does not necessarily imply higher earnings. Therefore, 
there could be a disagreement about which norm is appropriate. This disagreement may 
increase the likelihood that punishment is viewed as inappropriate and that the punishment 
                                                            
3 Ellickson (1991) refers to enforcement costs as transaction costs (p.173). 5 
 
triggers counter-punishment (Denant-Boemont et al. 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008).
4 This counter-
punishment, in turn, would be more likely to be interpreted as unjustified, and a sequence of 
retaliations may ensue.  
The results from the experiment support the hypothesis. In the presence of normative 
conflict, 37 percent of instances of punishment trigger counter-punishment, compared to 14 
percent in the absence of normative conflict. As a result, norm enforcement is nearly four 
times more likely to lead to a feud in the presence of normative conflict than in its absence. 
Furthermore, in the setting with conflict, feuds are sufficiently costly that the cost of feuding 
fully offsets the welfare gain from greater cooperation that the punishment mechanism yields. 
Our results suggest that self-enforcement of cooperation may be more difficult than 
previously thought, due to the possibility of feuds and their impact.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the experimental 
design and procedures. In Section 3, we present the results from the experiment. Section 4 
concludes.   
2. The Experiment 
2.1 Earlier studies guiding the design 
Our experimental design builds on previous studies that have used laboratory 
experiments to investigate norm enforcement in social dilemmas. In pioneering studies, 
Yamagishi (1986), Ostrom et al. (1992), and Fehr and Gächter (2000) showed that 
individuals can sustain cooperation with the use of costly punishment. Despite incurring a 
substantial cost to themselves, individuals are willing to punish free-riders. A number of 
subsequent studies have corroborated these results (e.g., Anderson and Putterman, 2006; 
Carpenter, 2007; Fudenberg and Pathak, 2010; Masclet et al., 2003; Nikiforakis and 
Normann, 2008; Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Sefton et al., 2007). Behavior in these 
experiments indicates that most groups quickly adopt the norm of equal contributions, which, 
in the symmetric environments of these experiments, leads to equal earnings.  
A feature of all these studies is that individuals benefit equally from cooperation so that 
there is no obvious normative conflict. A few studies have allowed individuals to punish in 
the presence of an asymmetry in either the cost of contribution (Tan, 2008; Noussair and Tan, 
                                                            
4 Note that there are different profiles of contributions that satisfy each norm. For example, the equal-
contributions norm is satisfied for different values of x, as long as all group members contribute x. The existence 
of different contribution levels consistent with a given norm does not imply a normative conflict: the norm is for 
all to contribute the same amount. Given that a group chooses to apply a particular norm, it seems plausible that 
they would select the contribution profile, consistent with that norm, which maximizes efficiency net of 
enforcement costs, as suggested by Ellickson (1991).  6 
 
2011), in the return players receive from the public good (Reuben and Riedl, 2009), or in the 
punishment power of group members (Nikiforakis et al., 2010).
5  
In none of the aforementioned experiments were punished individuals allowed to 
counter-punish. Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis (2008) observe that many 
individuals are willing to counter-punish those who have previously sanctioned them. 
However, in these two studies, punishment cannot trigger a feud, as the number of rounds of 
punishment is exogenously restricted. Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011) are the first to study 
punishment behavior when feuds are possible in a public-good game. The manner in which 
we allow for feuds is similar to theirs, but with two important differences. First, we use a 
different punishment technology to ensure that all group members are equally able to engage 
in feuding (see section 2.4). Second, under their design, individuals are homogeneous and 
thus there is no normative conflict. They find that participants recognize the threat of feuds 
and employ strategies to avoid their breakout. As a result, feuds are rare. Their results have 
reinforced our belief that normative conflict would increase the likelihood of feuds.
6 
2.2 The encryption task 
All sessions are divided into two parts. The first part consists of the Encryption Task 
(Erkal et al., 2011). The encryption task is used to determine which group members have high 
returns and which group members have low returns from the public account in the second 
part of the experiment. The goal of the encryption task is to make the norm of equal 
contributions, which here implies unequal earnings, more salient, and thereby to sharpen the 
normative conflict.  
The task proceeds as follows. Subjects are given a table assigning a number to each 
letter of the alphabet. They are then presented with a sequence of different words, which they 
must encrypt. The words are the same for all players and thus they all face a task of equal 
difficulty. If a subject encrypts a word correctly, she is presented with a new word. A subject 
cannot proceed to the next word until he encrypts the word correctly. 
                                                            
5 Reuben and Riedl (2009) investigate the norms enforced by group members under a variety of asymmetries: in 
endowments, returns from public account and action sets. Punishment could not lead to a feud in Reuben and 
Riedl’s experiment. In addition, individuals in their study could not influence their returns from the public 
account. Therefore, the tension between the equal earnings and equal contribution norms might not have been as 
strong as in our experiment, where the return levels are assigned depending on the relative effort of the group 
members.  
6 Hopfensitz and Reuben (2009) study a variant of the trust game and allow subjects to engage in sequences of 
retaliatory punishment. They observe that some pairs engage in feuding and the threat of feuds helps prevent 
exploitation of the trust exhibited by the first mover. There are numerous differences between the study of 
Hopfensitz and Reuben and ours. With regard to punishment, the main differences are that punishment can only 
be used to retaliate (e.g., third parties cannot punish a counter-punisher to prevent a feud), and that subjects are 
randomly rematched in every period. This last feature limits the cost of starting a feud.  7 
 
The encryption task lasts ten minutes. To minimize selection effects (see the discussion 
in Erkal et al., 2011), the instructions explain that the two group members with the highest 
number of encrypted words will be assigned a higher return from a public account in the 
second part of the experiment. However, the instructions do not explain exactly what these 
returns will be or what will happen in the second part, though they do indicate that those who 
perform better on the encryption task would be in an advantageous position in the second 
part. Ties between individuals for the number of encrypted words are broken randomly.  
At the end of the first part of the experiment, subjects are informed about whether they 
are among the two highest encrypters in their group. No information about the exact number 
of words that other players encrypted is given until the end of the experiment. After subjects 
complete the encryption task they are given detailed instructions about the second part of the 
experiment. The data from the encryption task is presented in the appendix. 
The second part of the experiment differs between the three treatments. We describe 
each of the three treatments in the next three subsections.  
2.3 The No Feud treatment 
No Feud is the simplest of the three treatments. It provides a benchmark, with a 
normative conflict but no possibility of feuding, against which to compare outcomes in the 
presence of feud opportunities. The No Feud treatment is a voluntary contribution 
mechanism, with a linear production technology for the public good. At the beginning of each 
period, each participant is given an endowment of E$20. All players must decide 
simultaneously and without communication how much of their endowment to contribute to a 
public account, ci, where 0≤ ci ≤ 20. The remaining 20-ci stays in player i's private account. In 
addition to the money that player i keeps, she receives a fixed percentage of the group's total 
contribution to the public account, mi = {0.3,0.5}. The two group members that encrypted the 
most words in the first part are assigned mi = 0.5, while the other two subjects are assigned mi 
= 0.3. The earnings of player i are given by equation (1). 
πi= 20 – ci  + mi ∑   
 
      (1) 
At the end of each period, participants are informed about the group's total contribution 
to the public account, the contribution of each individual, whether the individual making that 
contribution is low or high return, and his earnings from the period. In order to track behavior 
in the experiment, each group member is given a unique identification number (i.e., 1, 2, 3, or 
4). The payoff function given in equation (1), the content of the instructions, and the duration 
of the experiment (10 periods) are common knowledge among participants.  8 
 
2.4 The Asymmetric treatment 
The Asymmetric treatment is our main treatment of interest. In this treatment, a 
normative conflict exists and feuding is permitted. The first stage of each period is identical 
to a period of the No Feud treatment. However, in the Asymmetric treatment, each period 
includes one or more subsequent decision stages. In each of these stages, individuals 
simultaneously decide on how much punishment to assign to each of the other members of 
their group. The exact number of punishment stages a group enters depends on the 
individuals' punishment behavior.  
 In the first punishment stage, after observing the individual contributions to the public 
account and the associated earnings of each group member, subjects must decide whether, 
and by how much, they wish to reduce the earnings of each of the other members of their 
group. To do so, they purchase (punishment) points. Punishment is costly for both the 
sanctioning and the sanctioned parties. An individual must pay E$1 in order to assign points. 
This punishment fee allows an individual to assign as many points to as many group 
members as he wishes, for the remainder of the current period. This cost structure has the 
feature that the asymmetric returns from the public account do not undermine the ability of a 
low return type to punish and to engage in a feud. In other words, unlike other punishment 
mechanisms used previously in the literature, this mechanism allows high and low return 
individuals to assign the same number of points.
7 Each punishment point reduces the earnings 
of its recipient by E$1. Let    
   denote the number of punishment points that player i assigns 
to j in punishment stage s (where i, j = 1, ..., 4; i ≠ j) Player i's earnings at the end of the 
period are, accordingly, 
         
   2 0          ∑   
 
      ∑∑   
   
   
   
 
                                         (2) 
The maximum number of points that can be assigned to an individual in a given period 
cannot exceed the recipient's earnings from the first stage, that is, ∑∑    
   
   ,        
   
    . 
Individuals can always assign points even if the fee would make their own earnings negative. 
This implies that counter-punishment cannot be preempted and that the lowest possible value 
of   
  is -1. The number of points that an individual can assign to a player cannot exceed the 
earnings of a player, after taking into account the reduction in points that the recipient has 
                                                            
7 This punishment technology is markedly different from the one used by Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011) as 
well as that employed in previous experiments. The positive punishment fee ensures that self-regarding subjects 
will never punish, under the usual assumptions of common knowledge of money maximization and rationality. 
While the direct marginal cost of punishment is zero, the overall cost is endogenous and may be large since  
counter-punishment is also very cheap. 9 
 
experienced from punishment in earlier stages of the same period. Thus, if   
   2 0   and 
∑    
   
   ,     1 6 , the maximum number of points that one could assign to i in punishment 
stage 2 is equal to four. 
A period ends and a new one begins if either (i) no points are distributed in a given 
stage or (ii) points are distributed, but no player would be allowed to assign any more points 
if another stage was to follow because they have no remaining period earnings. Note that the 
punishment fee is only paid once per period. If a new punishment stage is entered, individuals 
are informed about the number of points each group member assigned to him in the previous 
stage, the total number of points each group member assigned to him so far in the period, and 
the number of points each group member assigned to his peers in the previous stage. The 
presentation format ensures that a player is able to connect this information about a player’s 
punishment behavior with how much the player contributed in stage one (the contribution 
stage). The payoff functions (1) and (2), the duration of the experiment (10 periods), and the 
instructions are common knowledge to participants. In order to prevent subjects from making 
losses, each subject is given a one-off lump-sum payment of E$40. 
2.5 The Symmetric treatment 
The aim of the Symmetric treatment is to provide a benchmark against which to 
evaluate the impact of normative conflict in the presence of feuding opportunities. The 
treatment is similar to the Asymmetric treatment. The main difference is that all individuals 
receive the same percentage of the group's total contribution to the public account. That is, mi 
= 0.4 for all i. This value is chosen such that total group earnings under the efficient outcome, 
when all players contribute their entire endowment to the public account, are the same across 
treatments.  
In order for the treatment to be comparable to the Asymmetric treatment, subjects 
participated in the real-effort task. They were told that the purpose of this part of the 
experiment was to determine "whether or not an individual will be allowed to participate in 
the second part of the experiment. In order to be allowed to continue with the second part, 
each participant must encode 30 words." This, and the fact that mi = 0.4 for all i, are the only 
differences between the Symmetric and Asymmetric treatments. 
Table 1 summarizes our experimental design.  





The experiment was conducted in the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the 
University of Melbourne in February 2008. The 192 participants were students from the 
University of Melbourne, recruited randomly from a pool of more than 2000 volunteers using 
ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Each subject took part in only one of the three treatments, and none 
of the subjects had previously participated in a social dilemma experiment. Each session 
consisted of 10 periods, under a single treatment. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were seated at partitioned computer 
terminals and were randomly assigned to groups of four individuals. Participants were not 
given any information about who the other members of their group were. Group composition 
remained unchanged throughout the experiment. Subjects were then asked to read a set of 
instructions.
8 
Before the experiment could begin, each participant was required to answer a number 
of control questions. The aim of these questions was to help participants understand the 
game. The experimental sessions lasted approximately 60 minutes for the No Feud treatment 
and 90 minutes for the Symmetric and Asymmetric treatments. The average payment was 
AU$39.17 in the No Feud treatment and AU$41.12 in the Symmetric and Asymmetric 
treatments. These totals include a show-up fee of AU$6 given to prevent participants from 
having negative earnings in the treatments with feuding opportunities. At the time of the 
experiment, the minimum hourly wage was AU$13.74. The average payment (AU$40.38) 
was equivalent to roughly US$37. The exchange rate between experimental and Australian 
Dollars was E$1 = A$0.15. The experiments were conducted using zTree (Fischbacher, 
2007). 
3. Experimental Results  
The analysis of the experimental data is divided into three parts. In the first part, 
comprising subsection 3.1, we provide evidence for the existence of normative conflict in the 
Asymmetric treatment. In the second part, subsection 3.2, we present our main findings 
regarding the impact of normative conflict and feuding. We first consider the treatment 
differences with regard to contributions to the public account and group earnings, and report 
our main findings as results 1 and 2. We then turn to the incidence and severity of 
                                                            




punishment, counter-punishment, and feuds. In the third part, subsection 3.3, we make some 
observations regarding the characteristics of the feuds observed in the experiment.
9  
3.1 Establishing the existence of normative conflict 
Previous public good experiments with punishment opportunities and homogeneous 
players have established that the contributions of group members (and hence their earnings) 
converge over time to a common level within a group (e.g., Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; 
Nikiforakis, 2010). This, along with the fact that deviations from the average contribution in 
a group trigger punishment, suggests that groups establish a norm of equal contributions and 
earnings. As described in sections 1 and 2, in the Asymmetric treatment, group members 
have different returns from the public account. This implies that equal contributions do not 
translate to equal earnings and could create a normative conflict. On the one hand, there is the 
norm of equal contributions. On the other hand, there is the norm of equal earnings, which 
prescribes that high-return group members contribute 2.33 times as much as the low-return 
individuals.  
Our first task is to examine whether one of the two norms is more salient to 
participants. For this reason, Figure 1 compares the ratio of contributions by high- and low-
return group members in each group in the Asymmetric treatment.
10 Observations close to the 
45-degree line are taken to be evidence that groups have adopted the equal-contributions 
norm (i.e., all contribute the same amount irrespective of their individual returns from the 
public account). The line below the 45-degree line has a slope of 0.43 (=1/2.33). 
Observations close to this line are taken as evidence that groups have adopted the equal-
earnings norm (i.e., the low-return individuals contribute 43 percent of what the high-return 
individuals contribute).  
If there was no normative conflict, we would expect all observations in Figure 1 to be 
clustered around one of the two lines. Instead, we observe considerable heterogeneity with 
regard to the norms adopted across groups. In five groups, all members contribute 
approximately the same amount. In four of them, all individuals contribute all or almost all of 
their endowment, which is the efficient norm (ignoring any disutility arising from the 
existence of unequal earnings). In most groups, however, high-return members contribute 
                                                            
9 While the complexity of our experiment adds realism and allows participants to use a range of strategies, it 
also makes it difficult to make inferences regarding the impact of endogenous variables. For this reason, our 
analysis will be largely restricted to investigating the impact of normative conflict and feuding opportunities. 
10 For this exercise, we use only the data from the second half of the experiment as groups typically take a 
number of periods to converge to a small range of contribution. The last period is dropped to avoid end-game 
effects. Within-type variance in contributions within groups is low in the periods used. That is, individuals with 
the same return from the public account within the same group tend to contribute at a similar level.  12 
 
more than their low-return peers on average. The average contribution of high-return 
individuals in periods 6 to 9 in the Asymmetric treatment is E$12.05, while their low-return 
peers contribute E$8.93 (a ratio of 1.35). The fact that these observations are above the equal-
earnings line, however, indicates that the relative contributions of the high-return individuals 
are not high enough so that earnings are equalized.
11 The difference between the two types is 
highly significant, according to a two-tailed Wilcoxon, signed-rank test with groups as 
independent observations (z= -3.286,  p-value < 0.01). The earnings of high-return group 
members (E$27.93) are significantly higher than those of their low-return counterparts (E$20. 
71) (z= -3.516, p-value < 0.01). 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
Patterns in punishment assignment provide additional evidence for the existence of 
normative conflict. If normative conflict exists in the Asymmetric treatment, one would 
expect some low-return individuals to reduce the earnings of high-return group members 
when they contribute the same amount as they do, punishing conformity to the equal-
contribution norm. Similarly, some high-return individuals might reduce the earnings of low-
return individuals when the latter contribute 43% of the amount that they do, punishing 
conformity to the equal-earnings norm. This is indeed the case. In the first half of the 
experiment, the average contribution of low and high-return individuals when punishment is 
assigned by low-return group members in the first punishment stage is roughly equal (E$8.82 
and E$7.99, respectively). The average contribution of low and high-return individuals when 
punishment is assigned by high-return group members in the first punishment stage is E$4.98 
and E$13.46, respectively.
12 
The observations in this subsection inform the empirical strategy that we follow for the 
rest of the paper. As suggested in Figure 1, there is a considerable degree of interdependence 
in the actions within groups.  It follows, therefore, that we cannot treat each individual within 
a group as an independent observation.  Following the literature, we report two-tailed, Mann-
                                                            
11 Reuben and Riedl (2009) propose that when there is normative conflict, a proportionality norm might arise. 
This norm specifies contributions between the equal earnings and equal contribution outcomes considered here. 
Many of our groups converge to making contributions in this range. See Young (1998) for a theoretical 
explanation of why outcomes that represent a compromise for two parties may be more likely to be selected than 
extreme outcomes.  
12 For these calculations we use data only from the first half of the experiments, as this is the time interval where 
normative conflict would likely be most apparent. The average contribution of low and high-return individuals, 
when the former did not assign punishment points, was E$8.86 and E$12.15. The average contribution of low 
and high-return individuals when the latter did not assign punishment points was E$10.95 and E$12.44.  13 
 
Whitney tests, with groups as independent observations, when analyzing treatment 
differences in contributions and earnings.
13  
3.2 The impact of normative conflict in the experiment 
Figure 2 presents the time profile of average contributions in each treatment. The figure 
shows that average contributions are greater in the two treatments with punishment, 
Symmetric and Asymmetric, than in No Feud, in period 1.  Afterward, contributions stabilize 
at an intermediate level in the Asymmetric and Symmetric treatments, whereas cooperation 
unravels in the No Feud treatment.
14 The average contribution level is about 3 ECU, or 15 
percent of endowment, greater in Symmetric than in Asymmetric throughout the time 
horizon.  
Figure 3 presents average earnings over time in each treatment. Average earnings are 
lower in the Asymmetric than in the Symmetric treatment throughout the experiment. In each 
treatment, earnings are closer to the E$20, corresponding to the subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium, than they are to the maximum possible average of E$32. Average earnings are 
E$21.59, E$22.12, and E$23.76 in the Asymmetric, Symmetric and No Feud treatments, 
respectively. In the No Feud treatment, average earnings are E$24.10 in the first period. 
Thereafter, earnings decline steadily as cooperation unravels. In the Asymmetric treatment, 
average earnings start at 12.20, and increase over time, stabilizing around period 6 at roughly 
E$23. The Symmetric treatment follows a similar trajectory, though at a greater level of 
earnings throughout the time horizon, with the exception of the final period.
15  
[Insert figures 2 & 3 here] 
Figures 2 and 3 suggest that normative conflict has a negative effect on contributions 
and overall earnings. Non-parametric statistical tests, however, indicate that while the 
reduction in earnings is significant, the decrease in contributions is not. 
                                                            
13 In order to ensure that our treatment effects are not being driven by outliers, we also run clustered versions of 
the Ranksum test as developed by Datta and Satten (2005), for all tests reported in this paper to ensure 
robustness. All results reported are robust to these more conservative testing procedures. 
14 One group has been dropped from the analysis. The reason is that one member of this group always reduced 
the earnings of the other group members to 0 irrespective of their actions. The result was that all group members 
had earnings of either 0 or -1 in every single period of the experiment.  
15 The convergence in earnings in the last period between Asymmetric and Symmetric is likely due to an end-
game effect that appears in some sessions. Punishment levels increase in the last two periods in the Symmetric 
treatment. Nikiforakis and Engelmann (2011) report a similar end-game effect. They attribute it to the fact that, 
as the experiment nears the end, the maximum length of a feud is reduced and the cost of punishment declines 
correspondingly.  14 
 
Result 1: Normative conflict reduces earnings. In particular, earnings are lower in the 
Asymmetric treatment than in the Symmetric treatment, despite similar contribution levels.  
SUPPORT: We cannot reject the hypothesis that the average contribution is the same in the 
Symmetric and Asymmetric treatments (z=1.447, p-value = 0.15). The difference in earnings 
between Asymmetric and Symmetric is significant at the 10-percent level (z =1.798, p-value 
= 0.07). □ 
A comparison between the Asymmetric and the No Feud treatments measures the effect 
of the imposition of a ban on feuding. Result 2 describes the effect of such a prohibition on 
contributions and earnings. 
Result 2: Contributions are greater in the Asymmetric than in the No Feud treatment, but 
earnings are not significantly different between the two treatments. 
SUPPORT: The average contribution in the Asymmetric treatment is 10.44, while it is 3.53 in 
No Feud. The difference is significant (z=-3.761, p-value < 0.01). Despite this, the difference 
in earnings between Asymmetric and No Feud is not significant (z =0.276, p-value = 0.78).
16 
□ 
 Result 1 shows that a normative conflict reduces earnings, even though it does not 
reduce average contributions significantly. This suggests that there is more punishment, some 
of which may be in the form of feuds, in Asymmetric than in Symmetric. Result 2 shows that 
banning punishment reduces contributions without changing overall earnings. This would be 
the case if the reduction in the cost of punishment from the ban roughly offset the lower 
contributions resulting from the absence of the option to use sanctions to enforce the norms. 
We next turn to the topic of punishment. 
We begin the analysis with first-stage punishment and recipients’ subsequent reaction. 
If our experimental design is successful in generating normative conflict, we would expect to 
observe more counter-punishment in the Asymmetric than in the Symmetric treatment. Our 
results regarding treatment differences in first-stage and counter-punishment are stated as 
result 3. 
                                                            
16 While the Symmetric treatment differs from No Feud with respect to two factors (the existence of feuding 
opportunities and heterogeneity in the returns from the public account), for completeness we report that we 
reject the hypothesis that contributions are the same in the No Feud and Symmetric treatments (z =-4.004, p-
value <.01), and the hypothesis that earnings are the same in the Symmetric and No Feud (z =-1.641, p-value = 
0.10). Contributions and earnings are both greater in Symmetric. 15 
 
Result 3: Normative conflict increases the extent of counter-punishment. In particular, while 
participants assign a similar level of first-stage punishment in the Asymmetric and Symmetric 
treatments, they are substantially more likely to counter-punish in the second stage of the 
Asymmetric treatment. The severity of counter-punishment, conditional on its application, is 
also greater in the Asymmetric treatment.   
SUPPORT: Figure 4 presents the likelihood and severity of first-stage punishment and 
second stage counter-punishment, in each treatment. The severity refers to the number of 
points assigned, conditional on the application of punishment. Clearly, first-stage punishment 
is more likely to trigger counter-punishment in the Asymmetric than in the Symmetric 
treatment. Thirty-seven percent of all instances of first-stage punishment are followed by 
counter-punishment in Asymmetric, while only 14 percent of first-stage punishment is 
retaliated in Symmetric.
17 The difference is highly significant (p-value<0.01). Furthermore, 
counter-punishment is more severe under Asymmetric. Conditional on counter-punishment, 
the average number of “counter-points” in the Asymmetric treatment, 8.9, is substantially and 
significantly higher than in the Symmetric treatment, 5.2 (p-value< 0.02).
18  
The greater frequency and severity of counter-punishment does not seem to deter the 
use of first-stage punishment in Asymmetric relative to Symmetric. As can be seen in Figure 
4, there is no significant difference, either in the probability of first-stage punishment in the 
two treatments (p-value=0.26), or in the severity of first-stage punishment (p-value=0.80). In 
light of previous evidence showing that the demand for first-stage punishment is reduced as 
the threat posed by counter-punishment increases (e.g., Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; 
Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011), the similar levels of investment in 
first-stage punishment in the Asymmetric and Symmetric treatments, despite the greater risk 
of reprisal in Asymmetric, can be taken as additional evidence of the existence of normative 
conflict in the experiment. □ 
[Insert figure 4 here] 
The increased use of counter-punishment in the presence of normative conflict creates 
favorable conditions for the emergence of feuds. We now examine the impact of normative 
                                                            
17 As a basis of comparison, in the experiment of Nikiforakis (2008), where counter-punishment cannot lead to 
counter-counter-punishment, 25 percent of all instances of first-stage punishment trigger counter-punishment.  
18 Many participants seem to anticipate that punishment may trigger counter-punishment. Despite the marginal 
cost of zero for assigning additional punishment points, the modal income reduction in the first punishment 
stage, conditional on income reduction, is only E$1 in Asymmetric and E$2 in Symmetric. Only 26 and 29 
percent of cases of first-stage punishment involved income reduction of more than E$5 in the Asymmetric and 
Symmetric treatments, respectively. The cautious use of punishment is rational: the average income reduction in 
the first punishment stage in Asymmetric is E$7.9 when it leads to counter-punishment, and E$4.9 when it does 
not. That is, harsher first-stage punishment is more likely to trigger counter-punishment.  16 
 
conflict on feuds. Our definition of a feud is the same as in Nikiforakis and Engelmann 
(2011). We say that a feud has occurred in period t, if there exists a punishment stage s in 
period  t, for which      
   0 ,        
     0 , and    
     0 , where    
   is the number of 
punishment points that player i assigns to player j in stage s > 0. For s > 1, we require the 
additional condition that     
     0 .  That is, a feud is defined as an episode in which a 
punishment is initiated, it is retaliated in the next stage, and the original punishing party 
sanctions the counter-punisher again in the subsequent stage. We restrict our analysis to 
within-period feuds, since there is only one case of a multiple-period feud. Our main result is 
reported as result 4, and confirms the hypothesis that we advanced in section 1, that 
normative conflicts make feuds more likely. Results 5 and 6 report three more empirical 
findings that illustrate further the negative impact of normative conflict. 
Result 4: Normative conflict substantially increases the likelihood that a feud erupts.  
SUPPORT: Of the 16 groups in the Asymmetric treatment, 12 experienced at least one feud 
(75 percent). In contrast, only 6 out of 13 groups experienced at least one feud in the 
Symmetric treatment (46.2 percent). In total, there were 30 feuds in the Asymmetric 
treatment and 8 in the Symmetric treatment. There were 1.88 feuds per group in the 
Asymmetric treatment and 0.62 feuds per group in the Symmetric treatment. Five of the 8 
feuds in the Symmetric treatment (62.5 percent) occurred in period 1. In contrast, under 
Asymmetric, only 43.3 percent of the 30 feuds occurred in the first period. □  
Result 5: The total demand for punishment across all stages, and the percentage of 
participants who engage in punishment, is greater in the presence of normative conflict than 
in its absence.  
SUPPORT: Figure 5 provides an overview of the demand for punishment over all stages, by 
period. The lines in Figure 5 present the average number of points assigned across all stages 
in a given period. The average number of points assigned across all stages in the Asymmetric 
treatment is 4.61. This is more than twice as large as the average number of points assigned 
in the Symmetric treatment, which is 2.14. The difference is statistically significant (z=-
5.383; p-value < 0.01). Also, the percentage of individuals who paid the punishment fee 
(E$1) to assign points at least once in the experiment is considerably greater in Asymmetric 
(85.9 percent) than in Symmetric (63.5 percent). The difference is statistically significant (p-
value < 0.01). □ 17 
 
[Insert figure 5 here] 
Result 6: Participants are more likely to have negative period earnings when there is 
normative conflict. 
SUPPORT: The lowest possible earnings in a period are E$-1. In 7.34 percent of possible 
instances in the Asymmetric treatment (47 out of 640), a subject’s earnings at the end of the 
period were E$-1. In contrast, this occurred in only 1.9 percent of cases in the Symmetric 
treatment (10 out of 520). □  
The negative impact of normative conflict on efficiency is also evinced by the number 
of cases in which a subject’s earnings at the end of a period were below E$20. This is the 
earnings a player would have if it was common knowledge that all group members were 
selfish, money maximizers. Earnings below E$20 occurred in 28.6 percent of cases (183 out 
of 640) in the Asymmetric treatment and in only 13.7 percent of possible cases in the 
Symmetric treatment (71 out 520). The negative impact of normative conflict is perhaps best 
seen in Figure 6 which presents the evolution of earnings over time for each group. The 
figure shows how groups in the Asymmetric treatment often shift quickly from high to low 
earnings, and vice versa. In contrast, this rarely happens in the Symmetric treatment.  
[Insert figure 6 here] 
Finally, we examine the number of stages used in each of the treatments with feuding 
opportunities. The bars in Figure 5 present the average number of stages utilized; an average 
of 1 indicates that all individuals abstained from punishing in a given period, and hence 
utilized only the first stage. In most periods, both the average number of points assigned and 
the number of stages utilized are greater in the Asymmetric treatment. While the average 
number of stages per period is greater in Asymmetric (2.2) than in Symmetric  (1.8), the 
difference is not significant (z=-1.340,  p-value = 0.18). The absence of a significant 
difference may be due to the higher percentage of individuals with negative earnings, which 
require them to stop punishing for the period.  
3.3 Some observations regarding feuds in the experiment 
Our experiment is not designed to study factors, other than normative conflict, that may 
trigger feuds. Nevertheless, we examine the data for recurring patterns which may shed light 
on what other factors might be associated with feuds. We discuss only feuds in the 
Asymmetric treatment as there are too few observations in the Symmetric treatment.  18 
 
First, as expected, 90 percent of the 30 feuds commence with first-stage punishment. In 
the majority of these cases (77.8 percent), the first-stage punisher had contributed at least as 
much as the recipient who counter-punished. The average contribution of the first-stage 
punisher is 11.26, while the average contribution of the counter-punisher is 5.56.  
Second, most feuds (70.4 percent) triggered by first-stage punishment are between 
high-return and low-return group members. This is exactly what we would expect if feuds 
were fuelled by normative conflict. In particular, roughly one half of the feuds triggered by 
first-stage punishment involve a high-return group member punishing a low-return peer (48.2 
percent) in the first stage. The average contribution of the high-return punisher in these cases 
is much greater than that of the low-return counter-punisher (13 and 1.9, respectively).
19 This 
suggests that there exists a real conflict in opinions within some groups regarding what 
actions should be punished. In line with this, when a low-return group member is the first to 
punish in a feud and the target is a high-return peer (in 22.2 percent of instances of feuds), the 
average contribution of the low-return player is lower than that of the high-return (9.41 and 
11.23, respectively).  
Third, men and women are equally likely to be involved in a feud. Of the 60 individuals 
involved in the 30 feuds, 53.3 percent are men and 46.7 percent are women. This corresponds 
almost exactly to the share of the participants that are of each gender; 53.1 percent men and 
46.9 percent women. Subjects are equally likely to enter into a feud with an individual of the 
same gender as with an individual of the other gender. This is not surprising given that 
individuals could not identify the gender of their peers. 
Fourth, feuds are typically very costly, and end only when the resources of the feuding 
parties are exhausted. The majority of feuds (87 percent) result in at least one of the parties 
having zero or negative earnings for the period. Also, most feuds (65 percent) result in both 
parties reaching zero or going negative. Thus, once a feud begins, it is rare for the parties to 
stop it voluntarily.  
4. Conclusion 
In recent years, economists and other social scientists have argued that cooperation can 
emerge spontaneously even in anonymous interactions, if individuals are allowed to punish 
                                                            
19 Overall, in 61 of the 85 cases (71.8 percent) of first-stage punishment by high-return group members, the 
victim was a low-return peer. The average contribution of high-return punishers was E$12.9, and that of low-
return recipients was E$3.1 As one may have expected, low-return group members target high-return subjects 
less frequently (in 59 out of 106 cases; 55.7 percent). The average contribution of high and low-return 
participants in these cases was E$4.9 and E$6.7, respectively.  19 
 
free riders. However, the bulk of the evidence in favor of this proposition comes from studies 
in which there is no normative conflict. In the absence of normative conflict, individuals can 
easily agree on what constitutes pro-social and thus appropriate behavior, and what 
constitutes opportunistic behavior. However, the world outside the laboratory is characterized 
by diversity. Individuals differ in multiple respects (e.g., wealth, nationality, religion, 
educational background, and age) making it more difficult to reach consensus about what 
actions are appropriate. This diversity might enhance the likelihood of a normative conflict.  
We find that, as in most previous studies, in the absence of normative conflict, peer 
punishment increases cooperation rates and welfare, as measured by total group earnings. 
However, when there is normative conflict, punishment often triggers counter-punishment 
and leads to feuds. These feuds are very costly for the individuals involved in them. As a 
result, the cost of feuding fully offsets the efficiency gain from greater cooperation that the 
ability to punish yields. 
As with any empirical finding, generalizations should be made with great care. 
Although our experiment allows participants to employ a range of complex strategies, by 
experimental standards, certain forces have been neutralized that may be important in the 
field. For example, if group members are allowed to communicate, it is possible that they 
may be able to agree on which actions should be punished and which ones should not. 
Nevertheless, our results indicate that improving efficiency in the absence of formal 
institutions may be more difficult than previously thought, as normative conflict appears to 
arise naturally in many circumstances. Indeed, field evidence suggests that uncoordinated, 
costly punishment is uncommon outside the laboratory (e.g., Guala, 2011). Our results 
suggest that peer punishment may be more efficacious in homogeneous populations, and 
perhaps even more so in closely-knit groups, where individuals are similar and may thus 
share a common understanding of what actions should be punished. 
Understanding how normative conflict arises, and how to design institutions that 
minimize the costs associated with the process of norm selection, are interesting topics for 
future research. Normative conflict creates a coordination problem. However, there may not 
be a simple solution for this problem. The difficulty arises from the fact that individuals have 
different preferences over norms, analogously to the difference in preferences players might 
have over equilibria in a Battle-of-the-Sexes or a Chicken game. As is sometimes the case in 
games with multiple equilibria, a certain degree of inefficiency may be inevitable in the 
presence of normative conflict. Self-serving individual biases may further exacerbate the 
coordination problem. As Elster (1989, p.115) remarks, “[e]ven if the belief in the norm is 20 
 
sincere, the choice of one norm among the many that could be relevant may be an 
unconscious act dictated by self-interest.”  
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APPENDIX:  Design Validation and Gender Stratification 
As with any experimental design, evaluation of the treatment effect may be biased if 
the sample is not fully balanced, despite careful randomization. In the literature on risk, social 
preferences, and competitive performance, it is often found that males and females respond 
differently to conflict and incentives.
20 One potential confound with our treatment effects, 
then, is that the composition of males and females might differ across treatments, and thus  
could lead to spurious results. To account for this potential confound, we stratified our 
sample based on gender, maintaining similar group compositions between treatments.
21  
There is no difference in the gender composition across any of the treatments. Table A1 
presents the number of males and females in each of our treatments as well as the results 
from the encryption task. As can be seen by comparing the number of males and females in 
each treatment, males constituted between 53 percent and 54 percent of the sample in each of 
our three treatments.  
In some of their experimental treatments, Erkal et al. (2011) found that male 
participants encrypted more words than female participants. A second potential confound, 
then, is that the proportion of males and females in the high-return group may differ. 
However, as shown in table A1, in our experiment, there is no difference in the proportion of 
males and females with high and low returns within or across treatments. There is no 
difference in the number of words encrypted between the Asymmetric and the No Feud 
treatments.  The table presents results from the encryption task used to assign individuals in 
the high and low-return groups. As can be seen by comparing the average number of words 
encrypted in the Asymmetric and No Feud treatments, there is no observable difference in the 
speed of encryption between the two treatments. This result is unsurprising given that the 
instructions prior to the encryption task were identical for both treatments. Comparing the 
proportion of males in the high and low-return groups, one can see that there is no selection 
into the high-return group based on gender.  In the Asymmetric treatment, exactly half of 
both men and women are in the high and low return groups.  Thus, gender composition does 
not appear to be a driver of the differences in behavior between the high and low return 
groups within a treatment, or between treatments. 
                                                            
20 See Croson and Gneezy (2009) for a review of the extensive literature on gender. 
21 Just as session-level heterogeneity in gender was a concern, so too was composition of groups within each 
treatment. In environments with normative conflicts, homogeneous groups might be more likely to be effective 
at adopting a norm than heterogeneous ones. To account for this, we further stratified groups according to 
gender in the sessions. Individuals were not informed of this stratification and were not made aware of gender 
group composition at any point in the experiment. Across all sessions, roughly 25 percent of groups were all 
female, 25 percent of groups were all male, and the remaining 50 percent of groups were mixed. Table 1 – Experimental Design
Treatment Normative Conflict Feuding Opportunities Number of Groups 
No Feuds (NF) Yes No  18
Asymmetric (ASYM) Yes Yes 16
Symmetric (SYM) No Yes 13Fi 1 Ci b ib l i h A i
20
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Instructions – Part 1 
 
These are the instructions for the Asymmetric treatment. The instructions for the other treatments 
differed only in those parts of the text that specifically corresponded to differences between the 
treatments. The instructions will be available for download at http://www.economics. 
unimelb.edu.au/staff/nikosn.  
 
General information  
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following instructions carefully, 
you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable amount of money. It is therefore important 
that you take your time to understand the instructions.  
 
The instructions which we have distributed to you are for your private information. Please do not 
communicate with the other participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions please 
raise your hand.  
  
During the experiment we shall not speak of Dollars, but of Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 
Your entire earnings will be calculated in ECUs. At the end of the experiment the total amount of 
ECUs you have earned will be converted to Dollars at the rate of 1 ECU = 15 cents and will be 
immediately paid to you in cash. In addition, we will give you a one-off payment of $6 (i.e. 40 ECU).  
 
At the beginning of the experiment the participants will be randomly divided into groups of four. You 
will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. The composition of each group will remain 
the same throughout the experiment.  
 
The experiment is divided into two parts. Here, we explain the first part of the experiment. Once the 
first part is finished you will receive detailed information about the second part of the experiment.  
 
The task  
In the first part, all participants will perform a task. The task is the same for everyone. You will be 
presented with a number of words and your task is to encode these words by substituting the 
letters of the alphabet with numbers using Table 1 on page 4. The task decision screen is seen in 
Figure 1.  
 
Example: You are given the word FLAT. The letters in Table X show that F=6, L=3, A=8, and T=19. 
 
Once you encode a word correctly, the computer will prompt you with another word to encode. Once 
you encode that word, you will be given another word and so on. This process will continue for 10 




The purpose of the task  
The relative performance of each individual in the task will influence their earnings in the second part 
of the experiment. This can happen in the following way. In the second part, each participant will be 
given an endowment (20 ECU) and will be asked to divide it between a private and a public account. 
There will be two types of players in your group. We will refer to them as “Type A” and “Type B”. 
Of the four individuals in your group, two will be of type A and two of type B.  
 
The difference between the two types of players is the return they get from the public account. In 
particular,  Type-A players will have a higher return from the public account than Type-B 
players. Both types will have the same return from the private account. Information about the exact 
returns will be given in the second part.  
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Relative Performance in Part 1 and Type Allocation 
The allocation of types depends on the relative performance of the individuals in your group. At the 
end of the Part 1, the computer will rank the members of the group based on the number of words they 
encoded. The two group members that rank first and second will be assigned the role of Type-A 
players. That is, the two group members with the highest number of encoded words will be 
assigned the role of Type-A players. The two group members that rank third and fourth will be 
assigned the role of Type-B players. If two or more participants tie, the computer will determine their 
type randomly.  
 
Once Part 1 is over, you will be informed as to whether you are of Type A or Type B and receive new 
instructions about the second part. You will not be informed about the precise number of words 
encoded by each group member until the end of the experiment. This will be done using a screen as 
the one in Figure 2. Note that certain information has been purposefully omitted from the figure. Note 
also that the number of words encoded is used for the purposes of this example and should not be 
taken as evidence of the number of words that one can or should encode. We expect participants to be 


































Z 15 29 
 
Control Questions  
Please answer the following questions. If you have any questions or have answered all questions, 
please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you. All participants must fill 
answer the questions below before the experiment can begin. 
 
1. What does the task in the first part determine? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
2. Consider the following example. Players 1, 2, 3, and 4 encode 5, 10, 12, and 4 words, respectively. 
In the boxes below tick the player(s) who will be Type-A player in part 2.  
□ Player 1  
□ Player 2  
□ Player 3  
□ Player 4  
 
3. Please state whether the following sentences are true or false.  
a. Type-A players will have a higher return from the private account in Part 2.  
□ True    □ False 
 
b. Type-B players will have a higher return from the public account in Part 2.  
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Instructions – Part 2 
 
Recall that at the beginning of the experiment, you were randomly divided into groups of four.  The 
composition of your groups for this part of the experiment is the same as in Part 1 and will 
remain the same throughout the remainder of the experiment. 
 
This part of the experiment will last 10 periods. In the beginning of the experiment, each participant in 
your group will be randomly given a number for identification (i.e. Player 1, Player 2, Player 3, and 
Player 4). Each participant will keep his/her identification number throughout the experiment.  
This means that if, for example, you are assigned the role of Player 3 at the beginning of the 
experiment you will continue to act as Player 3 in future periods. Further, since the group composition 
remains the same throughout the experiment, the participant assigned the role of Player 1 in the first 
period will be the same as the participant assigned to Player 1 in all future periods. The same applies 
for Players 2 and 4.  
 
Based on the number of words that you and the members of your group encoded, you will be assigned 
as either as either “Type A” or “Type B”.  Your type will remain the same throughout the 
experiment and will influence the value that you receive from the public account as explained 
below. 
 
Once the experiment is over the identities of each participant will be kept anonymous.  You will be 
paid in private and at no point will your group or player number be revealed.   
No one will know who was in their group or what actions were carried out by each individual. 
 
Each of the 10 periods is divided into a number of stages. Below we discuss the different stages in 
detail.  
 
The first stage (The Contribution Stage) 
At the beginning of each of the 10 periods each participant will receive 20 ECU. In the following, we 
shall refer to this amount as the “endowment”. Your task in the first stage is to decide how to use your 
endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 ECUs you want to contribute to a public 
account (from 0 to 20) and how many of them to keep for yourself. You will be able to make your 
decision by using a screen as the one in Figure 1 (shown for a Player of Type A). The consequences 
of your decision are explained in detail on the next page.    
 
Once all the players have chosen their contribution to the public account you will be informed about 
the group’s total contribution, your income from the public account and your payoff in this period 
through a screen as the one seen in Figure 2. Note that all numbers seen in the figures throughout this 





Figure 1 – Contribution stage (for Type-A players)  
 
 
Your earnings in each period are calculated using a formula that differs based on whether you are a 
Type-A player or a Type-B player.  The earnings of a Type-A player are calculated using the 
following formula. (If you have any difficulties do not hesitate to ask us.)  
 
Earnings at stage 1 =   Endowment of ECUs - Your contribution to the Public    
    Account + 0.5*Total contribution to the Public Account 
 
The earnings of a Type-B player are calculated using the following formula: 
 
Earnings at stage 1 =   Endowment of ECUs - Your contribution to the Public    
    Account + 0.3*Total contribution to the Public Account 
 
This formula shows that your earnings at the end of the first stage consist of two parts:  
1)  The ECUs which you have kept for yourself (endowment – contribution) 
2)  The income from the public account, which equals 50% of the group’s total contribution if 
you are of Type A and 30% of group’s total contributions if you are of Type B. 
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Figure 2 – Feedback screen after Contribution stage  
 
Example: Suppose the sum of the contributions of all group members are 60 ECUs. In this case, a 
Type-A member of the group receives an income from the public account of: 
0.5*60 = 30 ECUs. A Type-B member of the group receives an income from the public account of: 
0.3*60 = 18 ECUs.  If the total contribution to the public account is 9 points, then Type-A members 
receive 0.5*9=4.5 ECUs from the public account while Type-B members receive 0.3*9 = 2.7 ECUs 
from the public account. 
  
You always have the option of keeping the ECUs for yourself or contributing them to the public 
account. Each ECU that you keep raises your end of period income by 1 ECU. Supposing you 
contributed this point to the public account instead, then the total contribution to the public account 
would rise by 1 ECU. Your income from the public account would thus rise by 0.5*1=.5 ECU if you 
are a Type-A member and 0.3*1=0.3 ECU if you are a Type-B member. However, the income of the 
other group members would also rise by 0.5 or 0.3 ECUs each, so that the total income of the group 
from the public account would be increased by 2*0.5+2*0.3=1.6 points. Your contribution to the 
public account therefore also raises the income of the other group members. On the other hand you 
also earn an income for each point contributed by the other members to the public account. In 
particular, for each point contributed by any member you earn either 0.3 or 0.5 ECUs depending on 
your type. 
 
The second stage (Allocation Stage 1) 
In the second stage you will be informed about how much each group member contributed 
individually to the public account in the first stage. In this stage you can reduce or leave equal the 
earnings of each member of your group by distributing points. The other group members can also 
reduce your income if they wish to.   
 
To reduce another player’s earnings you will have to distribute points.  The fee for assigning points 
equals 1 ECU irrespective of (a) the number of points you choose to assign and (b) the number of 33 
 
players to which you assign points.  That is, you will pay 1 ECU whether you assign 1, 2, 3 or more 
points to a single player or 1, 2, 3 or more points to two or three players.  To assign points you will 
use a screen as the one seen in Figure 3. 
 
Every point you assign to another player reduces their earnings by 1 ECU. Similarly, your earnings 
will be reduced by 1 ECU for every point you receive from your group members. 
 
You may distribute as many points as you wish to a given player. However, the total number of points 
you assign to a given player cannot exceed that player’s earnings from the contribution stage.  
 
Example 1: Suppose that you give 2 points to player 1. This costs you 1 ECU and reduces player 1’s 
income by 2 ECU.   
 
Example 2: Suppose that you give 4 points to player 1 and 3 points to player 2.  This costs you 1 
ECU and reduces player 1’s earnings by 4 ECU and player 2’s earnings by 3 ECU. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Allocation stage 1 
 
Your total earnings from the two stages are therefore calculated as follows: 
 
Total earnings (in ECUs) at the end of the first stage = 
 
= Earnings from the 1
st stage – Points you receive 
 
If the number of points that you receive across stages exceeds your first stage earnings, participants 
cannot assign any more points to you.  In addition, all points exceeding your earnings from the 1
st 
stage will not be counted in determining your earnings from the stage.  The following example 
illustrates this point. 
 
Example 2: Suppose that your earnings at the end of the 1
st stage are 10.5 ECU and you are assigned 




Recall that the fee for assigning points equals 1 ECU.  Therefore, your earnings in ECU after the 
second stage can be negative.  The lowest possible ‘earnings’ you can have from a period is -1 ECU.  
If your earnings are negative at the end of the stage, this will be covered by the 40 ECU that we gave 
you in the beginning of the experiment. 
 
If none of the members of your group distributes points then the period finishes and the next period 
begins again with stage one. Otherwise, a third stage will follow.   
 
The third stage (Allocation Stage 2) 
In the third stage, you will be informed of the points that each person in your group assigned to you 
and the other members in your group. Similarly, the other members of your group will be informed 
about how many points you assigned to each of them. In addition, you will be reminded of the 
earnings each group member had after the contribution stage, and the total points each group member 
has received in total up to this point. Then you can again reduce or leave equal the earnings of each 
member of your group by distributing points. As in Allocation Stage 1, other group members can 
also reduce your earnings if they wish to. To assign points you have to use a screen similar to the one 
seen in Figure 4. 
 
Note that in this stage you do not have to pay the fee to reduce the earnings of others if you have 
already assigned points in the previous stage.  You may always assign points even if the fees would 
make your earnings negative.  
 
The number of points that you can assign to a player can not exceed the earnings of a player taking 
into account the points that he has already been assigned. Thus, if an individual began with earnings 
of 20 ECU and was assigned 16 points in allocation stage 1, the maximum number of points you 
could assign to him/her in allocation stage 2 is 4. 
 
Note that even if your earnings become zero (as a result of being assigned points by others), you will 
always be able to assign points as long as some individuals have positive earnings.  
 
Example 3:   Your earnings at the end of stage 1 were 20 ECU.  You chose to assign points to player 
1 in stage 2.  You also chose to assign points to player 1 and 2 in stage 2.  No points were assigned to 
you.  Therefore, your earnings will equal 20 – 1 = 19 ECU. 
 
Example 4: Assume you are player 2 in Figure 4. Assume also that you have not assigned any points 
in Allocation Stage 1. Your earnings after the contribution stage were 29 ECU. As you can see in 
Figure 4, in Allocation Stage 1 players 1 and 4 each assigned 2 points to you. Therefore, your 
earnings are reduced by 4 ECU. You also assigned 3 points to player 4 which costs you 1 ECU. 





Figure 4 – Allocation stage 2 
 
If none of the members of your group distributes points then the period finishes and the next period 
begins again with stage one. Otherwise, a fourth stage will follow.   
 
Fourth stage (Allocation stage 3) and beyond 
Your task in the forth stage and beyond is the same as in stage 3. After being informed of the points 
distributed in your group you will be able to assign further points. The costs of assigning points, as 
well as the earnings reduction caused by each point remain the same as before.  That is, if you have 
paid the fee to assign points to any player, you will not have to incur a cost to assign further points to 
any player.  As in previous periods, the implications of assigning or receiving points, as well as the 
restriction on the number of points that can be assigned to each player remain the same as before. 
 
When does a period end? 
 
A period ends and a new one begins when one of the following occurs.  
-  No points are distributed in a given stage. 
- Points are distributed, but no player would be allowed to assign any more points if another stage 
followed. This can happen if the points assigned to all players in the group are equal or greater than 
their earnings from the first stage.  
 
Below is an example illustrating when a period ends. (As all examples in the instructions, the entries 
should not be taken as a guide for behavior in the experiment.)  
 
Example:  
Assume that after the contribution stage, the payoffs are as follows: 
Player 1: 20 ECU 
Player 2: 25 ECU 
Player 3: 30 ECU 
Player 4: 35 ECU 
 
Assume that players have assigned points in Allocation Stage 1, 2 and 3. Further, assume that after 
Allocation Stage 3 the total number of points allocated to each player is:  36 
 
Player 1: 16 points 
Player 2: 27 points 
Player 3: 30 points 
Player 4: 32 points 
 
As the number of points assigned to players 2 and 3 is greater or equal to their earnings from the first 
stage, no further points can be assigned to them.  In addition, only the first 25 points will be counted 
in determining player 2’s earnings. 
 
Assume that in Allocation Stage 4 player 4 assigns 4 points to player 1 and no other player assigns 
points. Hence the total number of points allocated to each player is:  
Player 1: 20 points 
Player 2: 27 points 
Player 3: 30 points 
Player 4: 32 points 
 
As points were assigned, Allocation Stage 5 will be entered. Notice, however, that now points can 
only be assigned to player 4, the maximum number of which is 3 as otherwise the total number of 
points would exceed player 4’s earnings from the contribution stage.  
 
If no points are assigned at Allocation Stage 5 or if 3 points are assigned to player 4 the period will 
end. At the end of the period you will receive a summary of what happened in the period. The format 
of this summary can be seen in Figure 5.   
 
 
Figure 5 – Summary screen at the end of a period 
 
A paper summary sheet is available for each period on which you can keep track of any events that 
occurred in a period.  These notes will help you make decisions in future periods.  If you have any 
further questions please raise your hand and one of the supervisors will come to help you. Otherwise 






1.  Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. Nobody (including you) contributes any 
ECUs to the public account. How high are: 
a.  The earnings of Type-A players after the first stage?  ……… 
b.  The earnings of Type-B players after the first stage? ……… 
 
2.  Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. You contribute 20 ECUs to the public 
account. All other group members contribute 20 ECUs each to the public account. Suppose 
that you are a player of Type-A 
a.  Your earnings after the first stage?  ……… 
b.  The earnings of the other Type-A group members?……… 
c.  The earnings of the Type-B group members? ………. 
 
3.  Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. The other three group members 
contribute together a total of 30 ECUs to the public account. Suppose that you are a player of 
Type-A.  What is: 
a.  Your earnings after the first stage if you contribute 0 ECUs to the public account? 
………. 
b.  Your earnings at the end of the period if you contribute 15 ECUs to the public 
account? ………. 
 
4.  Each group member has an endowment of 20 ECUs. You contribute 8 ECUs to the public 
account. Suppose that you are a player of Type-B. What is: 
a.  Your earnings after the first stage if the other group members together contribute a 
further total of 7 ECUs to the public account?............... 
b.  Your earnings at the end of the period if the other group members together contribute 
a further total of 22 ECUs to the public account?............... 
 
5.  Your earnings from the first period are 25 ECU. How much will your earnings at the end of 
the second stage be if: 
a.  You receive 2 points, but do not assign any yourself? ………….. 
b.  You receive 2 points and assign 3 points yourself to a single group member?.......... 
 
6.  Assume you assign 2 points to another group member, no one else in your group assigns any 
points and all members in your group have a positive payoff. Will another stage follow? 
…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
7.  Assume no member of your group assigns points including you. Will another stage follow? 
…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
8.  Assume the earnings of Player 2 after the contribution stage are 25 ECU. Assume also that 
Player 1 assigns 25 points to Player 2. Will Player 2 be able to assign further points in this 
period? 
…………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 